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The Jacobean Peace
The Irenic Policy of James VI and I and its Legacy
Roger B. Manning
Cleveland State University, Emeritus
King James VI and I furnishes the example of an early modern monarch who pur-

sued a policy of peace that worked to his disadvantage. This irenic policy arose
more from circumstances than conviction. As king of Scotland, he had learned to
distrust the violent and warlike members of the Scots nobility, and diplomacy and
conciliation were the only instruments he had to deal with these ruffians. Despite
aspersions upon his manhood, he led attempts to suppress their rebellion, and
when he succeeded as king of England, he possessed more military experience
than any English monarch since Henry VII. Those of his subjects who attributed his irenicism to cowardice or effeminacy drew upon a literary tradition that
stretched back to classical antiquity. There were proponents of a more peaceful
foreign and military policy in England, but the war party conducted the more effective propaganda campaign, which had many supporters among the Puritans
in Church and Parliament. For all his great learning, James was ignorant of the
politics of mainland Europe, and he undervalued the Dutch Republic as an ally of
England against the very real danger of Spain. His reliance on diplomacy anticipated the means of resolving disputes in the future, but ignored the extent to which
England’s enemies, the Hapsburg rulers of Spain and the Holy Roman Empire,
used diplomacy for dissimulation. James’s attempt to play the role of rex pacificus
won him few supporters as did his failure to employ the martial talents of the
nobility to defend the cause of European Protestantism. Moreover, his failure to
maintain and improve the military resources of royal government and to reward
the martial endeavors of the aristocracies of the Three Kingdoms left his son
Charles I ill-prepared to deal with the rebellion of Parliament in the next reign.

“What hath effeminated our English, but a long disuse of arms.”
(Giovanni Botero, Relations of the Most Famous Kingdomes, 28.)

“The principal point of greatness in any state is to have a race of
military men. Neither is money the sinews of war (as it is trivially
said), where the sinews of men’s arms, in base effeminate people,
are failing.”
(Sir Francis Bacon,“Of the Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates,” 445-6.)
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The return of peace between England and Spain in 1604 may have

been welcomed by tax-payers and overseas merchants, but there was
a very vocal minority who belonged to the so-called ‘Puritan’ party
(the successors of the Elizabethan war party) who opposed peace
because they thought that it betrayed England’s Protestant allies in
mainland Europe and was more harmful to the commonwealth than
war. Like Sir Francis Bacon, they believed that the “principal point
of greatness in any state is to have a race of military men.” Divines
and military writers insisted that England had become effeminate
through the long disuse of arms. James VI and I disliked war and
martial men and preferred peace because he believed that his kingdoms lacked the financial resources for war, although the states of
mainland Europe continued to regard the British Isles as an important
source of military manpower. James feared the political and military
power of the nobility, and he diluted the peerages of the Three Kingdoms with non-military persons. However, he could not prevent
the remilitarization of these aristocracies from within their ranks.1
Peace brought official disengagement from the Anglo-Spanish War
and the Eighty Years War, and critics of James’s policy of peace
charged that he undervalued the valor of the nobility. After the Imperialist forces ejected his daughter Elizabeth and his son-in-law the
Elector Palatine from the Kingdom of Bohemia, they also accused
James of besmirching his dynasty’s honor and aiding the papalists
because of his failure to go to their aid and that of other Protestants
of mainland Europe in a timely fashion. James was also criticized
for failing to act the part of a soldier-king and to set a good example
for his subjects. He was accused of cowardice and effeminacy by
a few scurrilous writers, but more reputable writers also obliquely
criticized his policy of peace in verse and drama. At the same time, it
should be remembered that many of these criticisms were published
after James’s death. Denied the patronage and recognition of the
king, those writers who celebrated martial values looked elsewhere
and found encouragement at the court of Henry, prince of Wales as
1 These topics are discussed in Manning, Swordsmen and An Apprenticeship in Arms.
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well as the court of his daughter, Elizabeth of Bohemia, living in
exile in the Netherlands. The military men among the British aristocracies turned their backs on James’s court and continued to serve
in the armies of the Protestant powers–especially those of the Dutch
Republic and Sweden–and to volunteer for the relief expeditions
sent to Bohemia and the Rhenish Palatinate. The leaders of the war
party–including the so-called “military earls”–played a leading role
in the parliamentary criticism of the Jacobean peace and also provided much of the military leadership for the Palatine expedition.2
The Dangers of Peace
The argument that long periods of peace caused the exercise of arms
to wither and bred moral degeneracy was not new.3 Most Elizabethan writers continued to believe that the lack of opportunities to
appear on the battlefield effeminated the aristocracy, caused people
to grow discontented and mutinous and invited attack by foreign
powers; Sir Walter Ralegh and Dudley Digges thought that the concept of peace was a subject for humanist scholars to contemplate
in their studies. It can only be described as a personal philosophy;
not a political philosophy. Samson Leonard, a Neo-Stoic writer,
who had been a friend of Sir Philip Sidney, assumed that the period
of peace enjoyed by England early in the reign of James I could
not possibly last. Barnaby Rich, in his Allarme to England (1578),
expressed suspicions of all “peace mongers.” Those who opposed
war for the sake of conscience were simply misguided; most peace
mongers were opposed to war because of cowardice or an aversion to paying taxes. Rich also insisted that no one in Elizabethan
England had produced a compelling argument for pursuing peace.
Many writers who addressed the problems of war and peace thought
that a just war was a natural function of a healthy state and served
to correct vice and excess. A state could not remain long at peace
2 Carlton, This Seat of Mars, 79-81; Trim, “The Context of War and Violence,” 233-55.
3 Cotton, An Answer to Such Motives, 2, 5, 21, 23; Manning, War and Peace in the Western
Political Imagination, passim.
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without falling victim to civil wars and foreign aggression.4 These
unsettling notions were inculcated by exposure to Roman historians
such as Lucan, Tacitus and Seneca, which led to a characteristically
Neo-Stoic acceptance of war as an inevitable part of life; this is
probably one of the reasons why James VI and I had no use for NeoStoicism.5 Similar sentiments had been expressed in the late queen’s
reign before the official English intervention in the Eighty Years War
in 1585. Geffrey Gates had said that the state which was “not able to
stand in arms and to vanquish the rage and power of both intestine
and foreign violence” could expect to be overrun and subjected to
the “lust of the spoilers,” while Sir John Smythe, whose Certain
Discourses Military was suppressed by Elizabeth’s Privy Council,
wrote that nations which neglected military exercises would learn
that “long peace” led to “covetousness, effeminacies and superfluities.” Contrariwise, where martial exercises were pursued and “military prowess” was cultivated, one could expect “justice, nobleness,
science and all manner of virtuous and commendable occupations”
to flourish.6 Thomas and Dudley Digges asked: “who seeth not to
what height of riot in apparel, to what excess in banqueting, to what
height in all kinds of luxury our country was grown” in the reign of
Elizabeth; “the flower of England, the gentry and the better sort” had
fallen into a dissolute way of life, and in this they were imitated by
the commonalty. While some had charged, with some exaggeration,
that the late queen was “an enemy to [the] military profession,” it
remained true that “no prince or state doth gain or save by giving
too small entertainment unto soldiers.” The lesson to be learned was
that “the open show of peace bred divers corruptions.”7
4 Digges, Foure Paradoxes, or Politique Discourses, 1604, 109; Jorgenson, “Theoretical
Views of War,” 471, 477; Waggoner, “An Elizabethan Attitude toward War and Peace,”
22-3; Lucan, The Civil War, bk. I, p.15; Charron, Of Wisdome, fos. 3r & v.
5 Stifflet, Stoicism, Politics and Literature in the Age of Milton, 17,21; Skinner, “Classical
Liberty, Renaissance Translation and the English Civil War,” in Visions of Politics, 308-43;
Basilicon Doron, ed. McIlwain, 41-2.
6 Gates, The Defence of Military Profession, 10-11; Smythe, Certain Discourses Military,
ed. Hale, 7-8.
7 Digges, Foure Paradoxes, or Politique Discourses, 1, 99-100.
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The theme that the neglect of the military arts led inevitably to moral
decay continued to be expressed by preachers and military writers.8
Thomas Adams, in a sermon preached to the Honourable Artillery
Company of London in 1617, insisted that effeminacy was inconsistent with true nobility and maintained that Mars had been “shut out
the back gate” in England. He suggested that if the ladies were to
start withholding their favors–“to afford no grace to them that had
no grace in themselves”–England would once again have lords and
gentlemen who could tell the difference “between effeminacy and
nobleness.”9 Christopher Brooke, a poet, barrister and Member of
Parliament in 1614, used the description of Edward IV’s court in his
The Ghost of Richard III (1614) to suggest “Now Mars his brood
were chained to women’s locks” at the court of James VI and I.10 Sir
William Monson thought that it was probably inevitable that soldiers
living in a peaceable island such as England would be undervalued.
He also thought that the evil reputation of “Low-Country captains,”
who exploited their offices for profit and disdained to lead their soldiers into battle, had brought the military profession into low repute.
Consequently, any military successes enjoyed by English soldiers
serving in the armies of mainland Europe were to be attributed to
chance and fortune rather than valor.11
These values still held sway among swordsmen who had forborne
much in the late queen because she was a woman.Sir Walter Ralegh
blamed Queen Elizabeth for paying more attention to the advice of
members of the peace party on her Privy Council, such as William
Cecil, Lord Burleigh, and his son, Sir Robert Cecil, than to members
of the war party, such as Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester and Robert Devereux, second earl of Essex, in the prosecution of the wars
in the Low Countries, Ireland and on the high seas, but Elizabeth
8 Bacon, “Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates,” xii.185.
9 T. Adams, The Souldier’s Honour, sigs. B2 r & v. Cf. also Robert Johnson’s rather loose
translation of Botero’s Relazioni universali, 28.
10 O’Callaghan, “Talking Politics,” 41.1 (1998), 117.
11 Oppenheim (ed.), Naval Tracts of Sir William Monson, i.104.

Quidditas 39 153

understood that a defensive war policy was dictated by the limited
financial and manpower resources of England. Moreover, Elizabeth
had no wish to destroy Spanish power as long as France remained
a threat and she was uncomfortable with supporting a republican
regime in the Dutch Republic.12 Yet despite Elizabeth’s distrust of
swordsmen and her pursuit of a defensive war strategy, she achieved
a considerable degree of military glory by repelling two attempted
Spanish invasions, and advocates of an offensive war against Spain
in the next two reigns in retrospect would wax nostalgic about the
military and naval successes of the late Elizabethan wars.13
James VI of Scotland’s attitude toward peace with Spain as a diplomatic policy was shaped by the circumstances of his succession to
the English throne. James had failed to persuade Queen Elizabeth to
recognize his right of succession upon her death, so he apparently
came to some sort of agreement with Robert Devereux, second earl
of Essex, prior to the latter’s rebellion in 1601. Recognizing the advantages of a peaceful succession, Sir Robert Cecil saved the king
of Scots from his folly, and managed to keep James’s name out of
the trials of the Essex conspirators. As late as 1602, shortly before
Elizabeth’s death, James VI had told Cecil that he was opposed to
peace between England and Spain and to toleration of English Catholics because he feared that a Catholic prince, such as Philip III of
Spain might advance a claim to the throne of England with the support of Catholics.14 The policy of ending the war between England
and Spain, which led to the Treaty of London of 1604, originated
with Sir Robert Cecil rather than James VI and I. Indeed, while the
negotiations were going on at Somerset House, James was away on
a hunting tour of the Midlands. England was just emerging from the
crises of the 1590’s which might well have led to more domestic
12 Edwards, Life of Sir Walter Ralegh, i.245; Wernham, “Elizabethan War Aims and Strategy,” 340, 348-9, 361; id., “Queen Elizabeth and the Siege of Rouen, 1591,” ser., 15 (1962),
176-7.
13 Strong, The Cult of Elizabeth, 187-91; Barton, “Harking back to Elizabeth: Ben Jonson
and Caroline Nostalgia,” 715; Marshall, “‘That’s the Misery of Peace,’” 3.
14 Akrigg (ed.), Letters of King James VI & I, 9, 170-1, 200-2.
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unrest, and could not afford the continuing costs of war. Cecil also
assigned ending the Irish wars a higher priority, and assumed that
England could not make peace with Spain until Ireland had been
pacified and the Spanish denied the use of Ireland as a place where
they could stir up trouble in the British Isles.15

In 1598, the second earl of Essex, who had complained that he possessed no credit at court and admitted that his associates were mostly
military men, gave his reasons for opposing overtures for peace with
Spain. He argued that the Spanish would use peace for rebuilding
their military and naval strength to resume the war against England
at their leisure and would also be free to subdue England’s ally the
Dutch Republic. In an attack on the Cecilian strategy of fighting the
Spanish in Ireland, Essex regretted that money should be wasted and
the lives of brave men squandered “in a beggarly and miserable
Irish war.” He further lamented that “our nation [was] grown generally unwarlike; in love with the name and bewitched by the delights
of peace.” Essex argued that while a just and honorable peace was
always to be preferred to war, in England’s case, because more of
its revenues derived from trade rather than agriculture, and since
money was the sinews of war, and since its trade was interrupted by
the continuing Hispano-Dutch war, England was bound to continue
the war against Spain if it were to survive. Essex and his circle drew
upon the writings of the Roman historian Tacitus for an intellectual
foundation for the revival and strengthening of their martial ethos
and for depicting Spain as the perpetual enemy.16
Thus, James became disposed to a policy of peace with Spain only
after he became king of England. This is not to deny that James genuinely hated war, but that his more immediate motive was his worry
15 Croft, “Rex Pacificus, Robert Cecil and the 1604 Peace with Spain,” 140-54.
16 Devereux, An Apologie of the Earl of Essex, sigs. A3r & v, F3r. (This book was first
written in 1598 and published after Essex’s execution for treason. The title page graphically illustrates Essex’s belief that war will always devour peace, and features a woodcut
depicting a hawk (or other raptor) seizing a dove beneath the image of a benevolent Apollo.
All of this is enclosed in a cartouch bearing the motto “sic crede” [believe thus!]). See also
Kewes, “Henry Saville’s Tacitus and the Politics of Roman History in Late Elizabethan
England,” 515-51.
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that the continuation of the war would prove expensive, and that
the crown lacked the financial resources for pursuing such a policy.
The need to finance a war would make him dependent upon Parliament for subsidies, and thus diminish his sovereignty. To James,
peace meant the stability of his composite monarchy, good social
order and legitimacy.17 When James came to the English throne, he
brought with him a dislike of the Dutch as rebels against the king
of Spain combined with an ignorance of diplomacy and the politics
of mainland Europe. His policy toward the Dutch Republic, where
England maintained garrisons containing English and Scots troops,
was guided by his dislike of republicans and rebels, but also by his
belief that the religious diversity of the Republic grew out of the
popular nature of its government. James had no sense of how the collapse of the Dutch struggle would alter the balance of power across
the North Sea and deliver the formidable Dutch naval might into the
hands of Spain. Nor had he any appreciation of the English investment of men, blood and treasure in the Dutch resistance to Spanish
rule over the previous 35 years. He refused to listen to the English
war party because he feared the ambitions of their leaders such as
Robert Devereux, third earl of Essex, Henry Wriothesly, third earl
of Southampton, and Henry de Vere, eighteenth earl of Oxford, all
of them soldiers. James was also rude to the Dutch delegation which
had come to congratulate him on his recent accession to the English
throne. However, the skillful diplomacy of Maximilien de Bèthune,
later duke of Sully, persuaded James not to abandon the Dutch cause
completely; a small amount of assistance to the Dutch continued.18
This small concession to the support of the Dutch cause was not sufficient to appease Sir Edward Hoby, a leader of the war party in the
House of Commons, who, on more than one occasion, had fought
as a volunteer in the Netherlands. Hoby insisted that a close alliance
with the maritime provinces of Holland, Zeeland and Friesland was
17 S. Adams, “Foreign Policy and the Parliaments of 1621 and 1624,” 144; Smuts, “The
Making of Rex Pacificus,” 384-5.
18 Allen, Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 113-19; Grayson,“James I and the Religious
Crisis in the United Provinces, 1613-19,” 195-219.
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necessary for reasons both of trade and defense, and took precedence over the peace with Spain. A hostile Dutch Republic would
be more dangerous and more expensive to fight than a belligerent
Spain. Moreover, the preponderance of Protestantism in the United
Provinces and the assistance that the Dutch had provided in the past
should not be forgotten, because they might well furnish assistance
in future conflicts with Spain and France.19
When peace was concluded between England and Spain by the Treaty of London of 1604, the Dutch war effort was seriously hampered.
The United Provinces lost almost all of the financial support that
they had received from England during the previous two decades.
Spanish shipping could now pass through the English Channel without English interference, and the troops intended for the Spanish
Army of Flanders no longer had to proceed overland from Italy.
Moreover, a possible Anglo-Spanish alliance began to take shape,
and Spanish recruiting agents were allowed to draw upon the potential military manpower of the Three Kingdoms. However, this
embryonic alliance was sabotaged by the Gunpowder Plot of 1605
and the discovery that the conspirators were English veterans of the
Spanish Army of Flanders. There were also pledges which had been
made to the Dutch government that James could not well break.
Although the English government agreed in the peace treaty not to
continue financial assistance to those in rebellion against the king of
Spain, the matter of the English and Scots regiments in the States’
Army was not mentioned. The officers of these seven regiments
held their commissions from the States General and were paid by
the same, and so these regiments were allowed to continue to recruit
in the British Isles.20
The idea that war could be terminated by diplomatic negotiation
rather than the victory of one power and the defeat of another was
a new one at the beginning of the seventeenth century. This aston19 Thrush, “The Parliamentary Opposition to Peace with Spain in 1604,” 301-15.
20 Parker, The Dutch Revolt, 237; Dalton, The Life and Times of Sir Edward Cecil, Viscount Wimbledon, i.103-4.
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ished James’s subjects and other rulers of Europe, according to Arthur Wilson, the companion and secretary of the third earl of Essex. The king demonstrated his preference for peace and diplomacy
and his aversion to war by ending the Irish Rebellion and pardoning
Hugh O’Neill, earl of Tyrone. Tyrone seems not to have understood
James’s motives. He thought the English promise of peace was a
deception, and that peace on English terms would destroy the Gaelic
way of life, so he went into exile in the Spanish Netherlands.21
The Elizabethan and Jacobean courts reflected a wide variety of attitudes concerning war and peace. Elizabeth had wished to avoid
war for fiscal reasons, but had to face the reality of the Spanish menace, and sought to justify war by staging pageants that celebrated
classical heroes and tournaments and plays which glorified military
prowess and the values of chivalry. James’s policy of peace caused
him to turn away from such bellicose entertainments and play down
chivalric culture. James challenged the chivalric revival by employing poets and dramatists such as Ben Jonson (although he had been
a soldier in the Low Countries) to write masques which praised the
pursuit of peace. Jonson asserted that the aristocracy needed to give
up the pursuit of military glory and cultivate peaceful pastimes.
Whereas the Elizabethan tournament had glorified knightly chivalry, the Jacobean masque insisted that service to the monarch was
more highly esteemed than military glory. Such entertainments no
longer made reference to warrior-kings as in medieval times, nor did
they boast of military and naval power.22
The image that James VI and I projected was at odds with aristocratic
and martial values. James espoused a policy of peace at a time when
many of his subjects wished that he had unsheathed his sword and
championed the Protestant cause in the Thirty Years War. Instead, he
took up his pen as a scholar and a peacemaker, which unmanned him
21 Allen, Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, vii-viii; Wilson, The Life and Reign of James I,
ii.661; Walsh, An Exile of Ireland: Hugh O’Neill, 24-5.
22 Mulryne, “‘Here’s Unfortunate Revels,’” 165-7; Norbrook, Poetry and Politics in the
English Renaissance, 180-1; Smuts, Court Culture and the Origins of a Royalist Tradition
in England, 24-5.
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in the eyes of his critics who whispered that he was a sodomite. Sir
Anthony Weldon, a dismissed former official of the royal household
and one of the more scurrilous writers of his age, said of James that
“he naturally loved not the sight of a soldier nor any valiant man.”23
This is a harsh judgment–perhaps exaggerated–but, it was a perception shared by contemporaries.24 His nervousness in the presence of
weapons did not escape notice or comment. John Aubrey recounted
a story he had heard that when Sir Kenelm Digby appeared at court
to be dubbed a knight, “James I turned his face away from the naked sword, owing to a constitutional nervousness, and would have
thrust the point into Digby’s eye had not Buckingham interposed.”25
Sir Andrew Grey, a Scots soldier of fortune who had commanded
a regiment in the Palatine army, was an eccentric man who habitually dressed in a buff coat and armor whether he was on the battlefield or elsewhere; he appeared at court seeking employment for
the forthcoming campaigning season wearing a long sword instead
of a rapier and a pair of pistols in his belt. At least James was able
to make a joke about Grey’s uncourtly dress and told him that “he
was now so fortified that if he were but well victualled, he would be
impregnable.”26 Sir Anthony Weldon thought that James “was infinitely inclined to peace, but more out of fear than conscience, and
this was the greatest blemish this king had through all his reign; otherwise [he] might have been ranked among the very best of kings.”
23 M. Young, James VI and I and the History of Homosexuality,168. The belief that
James I was “a great coward, and hated the sight of a soldier” persisted to the end of the
seventeenth century. Cf. [Trenchard,] Short History of Standing Armies in England, 5.
Attacks upon an opponent’s masculinity was a rhetorical device frequently resorted to by
seventeenth-century polemicists to discredit an opponent’s credibility. Such tactics were
employed by John Milton in his political propaganda piece Pro Populo Anglicano Defensio (1658), which was an attempt to demolish the arguments put forth by Salmasius in
his Defensio Regia pro Carlo I, which the English Royalists had hired him to write. This
rhetorical device, which apparently derives from Cicero, was meant to cast doubt upon
Salmasius’s credentials as a defender of patriarchalism (Milton, Political Writings, xx, 58,
111, 193, 198. For a discussion of other seditious libels to which James I was subjected, cf.
Cressy, Dangerous Talk, ch. 5, esp. 94-6, 99-103.
24 Bamford (ed.), A Royalist’s Notebook, 193-4.
25 Dick (ed.), Aubrey’s Brief Lives, 97.
26 Grant, Memoirs... of Sir John Hepburn, 22.
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Weldon lived long enough to declare his allegiance for Parliament
in the English civil wars, and his book The Court and Character of
King James was published in 1651 to discredit the Stuart cause.27
Weldon was particularly critical of James because he spent far more
money sending ambassadors to treat with his enemies than, by Weldon’s estimation, he would have spent on a timely intervention in
the Rhenish Palatinate. Moreover, “it would have kept him in his
own inheritance and saved much Christian blood since shed.”28 Yet,
ironically, this man of peace based his claim to both the English and
Scottish thrones on the right of conquest, dating the former claim to
William the Conqueror and the latter to Fergus, first king of Scotland, who came out of Ireland.29
The Concept of a Warrior-king

There is good reason to doubt stories of James’s timidity. James
had been compelled to lead military forces into the field as king of
Scotland on six different occasions before 1594 in order to suppress
rebellions. Indeed, he possessed more military experience than any
English monarch since Henry VII.30 Considering the background of
his family in Scotland, one can understand why he might have been
paranoid about assassination plots and learned to abhor violence. He
was surrounded by it before his first memories were formed. His
father was strangled; his mother was beheaded after marrying the
man who probably killed his father. Three of his guardians were assassinated, and the only one that he ever cared for was sent back to
France. He witnessed murders, was kidnaped and his life threatened
on more than one occasion. James learned the skills necessary for
survival at an early age.31
27 Weldon, Perfect Description of the People and Country of Scotland, 16; DNB, sub Sir
Anthony Weldon; Bellany and Cogswell, Murder of King James I, 469-73.
28 Weldon, Court and Character of King James, 76-7, 7, 171.
29 McIlwain (ed.), The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, 61-3; Hill, “The Norman Yoke,” 61;
Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, 53-4, 285.
30 K. Brown, “From Scottish Lords to British Officers,” 134-5.
31 Akrigg (ed.), Letters of King James VI & I, 3-5.
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As king of Scotland James VI had ended the endemic blood-feuds
in Lowland Scotland, and had achieved considerable success in suppressing assaults and duels by nobles and their followers. He bound
the offending parties to the peace with heavy penalties, but this was
always accompanied by royal efforts at conciliation, because he
lacked the force to rule in any other way. James VI is regarded by
Scots historians as an able monarch, and was the most successful
of all the Stuart kings of Scotland in deciding on a policy and carrying it out.32 Clearly, his Scots subjects thought better of him than
his English subjects. After his death, James VI was eulogized by the
Neo-Latin poet, David Wedderburn, as “the peace-maker, the best
of kings,” who tried to calm the waters in an age of “party strife.”33
The Scots nobility remained strong during James’s reign, and many
continued to be crypto-Catholics while outwardly conforming to
Protestantism. James chose to be lenient toward the Scots Catholic
nobility because he did not wish to provoke any more blood-feuds
and because he preferred conciliation as a method of governing.
Moreover, he needed the help of the Scots nobility to make good his
claim to the English throne.34 James’s policy of reconciliation with
Catholics made the Reformation in Scotland a more peaceful and
less violent process than was the case in either England or France.
The king of Scots welcomed Catholics at the Stuart court because
he found their company congenial, and their presence helped to
counter-balance the influence of the Presbyterians in the Kirk. Consequently, James hoped that this same policy of conciliation would
work with Catholic powers abroad.35
Conciliation, whether with Catholics at home or the Hapsburg monarchies abroad was never a strategy favored by the Puritan war party
in England. Yet, it was a policy that James VI felt obliged to fol32 K. Brown, “The Nobility of Jacobean Scotland, 1567-1625,” 61-2; Wormald, “Princes
and the Regions in the Scottish Reformation,” 77; Donaldson, Scotland: James VI to James
VII, 214-15.
33 Allan, Philosophy and Politics in Later Stuart Scotland, 74-5.
34 Lee, John Maitland of Thirlstane, 177-92.
35 Patterson, King James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom, 18-2.
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low both before and after he became king of England in 1603. He
was also conciliatory to the English Catholics (and especially the
powerful interest of the Northern Catholic earls) and in his relations with the pope because he did not wish to incur the penalty of
excommunication before he succeeded to the English throne. Since
James was a Protestant, his subjects in both England and Scotland
always had difficulty in understanding why he conciliated the Catholic nobilities of those two kingdoms. Besides not wishing to drive
Catholic aristocrats into the hands of the Spanish or French, he also
wanted to avoid giving some fanatical Catholic an excuse to assassinate him. James, a well read monarch, was also aware that Scottish
historical tradition favored conciliation.36
Another argument against accusations of cowardice is James’s devotion to hunting. James spent a considerable amount of time in the
saddle hunting deer (to the neglect of his official duties, some critics
thought). Hunting–properly meaning the pursuit of deer on horseback–was no sport for timid persons, and was still widely regarded
as a rehearsal for war. James perhaps underestimated the symbolism
and theatrical display of a royal hunt. He disliked being watched by
the common people, he was careless about his appearance, wore only
a hunting horn instead of a sword, and drank heavily before hunting, so that he slumped in his saddle with his hat askew.37 Not only
was his demeanor unkingly; no one ever accused James of being a
gracious monarch. John Holles, first earl of Clare, told his nephew
Gervase Holles that the king was jealous of anyone whose hawks
and dogs surpassed his own. Clare always thought that this was one
of the reasons why he never found employment under James. Of
course, it must be added that Clare was also the head of a military
family and did not trouble to hide his dislike of and contempt for the
duke of Buckingham.38
36 Patterson, King James VI and I, 87-8; Donaldson, Scotland: James VI to James VII,
188–9.
37 Manning, Hunters and Poachers, 201-3; Letters of John Chamberlain, ed. McClure,
i.201; Bergeron, “Francis Bacon’s Henry VII,” 23; Wilson, The Life and Reign of King
James, The First King of Great Britain, ii.675; Bellany and MacRae (eds.), “Early Stuart
Libels,” online.
38 Holles, Memorials of the Holles Family, ed. Wood, 100.
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“The art of war is all that is expected of a ruler,” wrote Machiavelli.
He also said that “princes who have thought more of their pleasures than arms have lost their states.” The same lesson could have
been learned from Tacitus, who was also coming to be more widely
studied in early-Stuart England.39 Those who read Tacitus began to
view the court of James I as a place that harbored corruption, and
compared it to the Roman imperial court under Tiberius.40 The main
function of monarchy was still thought to be making war, and the
Stuart monarchy could not perform this function. A Spanish observer noted that James was “timid and hates war,” while one of James’s
own subjects referred to him as “Queen James.”41 The belief that a
king needed to be a soldier before he was fit to rule did not diminish
during the seventeenth century. In 1579, Geffrey Gates asserted that
“this generally is to be noted in warlike princes and nobility, that as
they excel in military prowess and worthiness, so do they excel in
wisdom and all nobleness of heart.”42 At the end of the seventeenth
century, during the Williamite Wars in Ireland in which he served as
a chaplain, George Story wrote that:
39 The exposure of the aristocracies of England and Scotland to Roman historians such
as Tacitus and Seneca led to a characteristically Neo-Stoic acceptance of violence and
war as an inevitable part of life. The theme that people, when exposed to long periods of
peace, grew discontented, indulgent and given to disorder and civil war, was taken up by
dramatists in the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods. Reading Tacitus also led to a greater
awareness of the distinction between Divine Providence and secondary causation in human history. This was called “politic history,” and it acquired a bad name in court circles
because most of its practitioners– many of whom harbored republican sentiments– moved
within the circle of Robert, 2nd earl of Essex (Waggoner, “An Elizabethan Attitude toward
Peace and War,” 23; Stifflet, Stoicism, Politics and Literature in the Age of Milton, 17,
21, 24, 27; Bradford, “Stuart Absolutism and the Utility of Tacitus,” 132; Lake, “From
Leicester his Commonwealth to Sejanus his Fall; Ben Jonson and the Politics of Roman
[Catholic] Virtue,” 130-35.
40 Salmon, “Stoicism and the Roman Example,” 209; Bellany and Cogswell, The Murder
of King James I, 255-6.
41 Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. G. Bull, 87; K. Brown, “From Scottish Lords to British
Officers,” 134-5; Scott, “England’s Troubles, 1603-1702,” 31-2; Cogswell, The Blessed
Revolution, 72.
42 Gates, Defence of Militarie Profession, 17-18.
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The courage and countenance of the chief commander in armies is a
material point in the success of the action, and especially in kings; for he
that has a genius to war has advantages above other men that makes his
gentry, nobility and officers strive to imitate his example, by which he is
better served and commonly more fortunate.43

Rex Pacificus
James’s first attempt to bring about European peace began during the
winter of 1589-90, when he was in Denmark to marry Anne of Denmark. After his return to Scotland he sent ambassadors to Denmark
for the occasion of the marriage of Anne’s older sister Elizabeth
to the duke of Brunswick in order to discuss his project for peace
with various European princes who were guests at the wedding.
Although the North German and Danish rulers lacked enthusiasm,
James never abandoned his dream of European peace. Just as James
believed that the peaceful union of England and Scotland was the
work of Divine Providence, so he also believed he was intended to
be a divine instrument in effecting a reconciliation of the Hapsburg
and Stuart composite monarchies.44 In his attempt to form a union
of his English and Scottish kingdoms and to persuade his subjects
to accept a common citizenship James was following the example
of the Romans who extended Roman citizenship to whole nations
of strangers to encourage them to assimilate Roman values, culture
and language. Had he succeeded, Thomas Hobbes believed that the
British civil wars could have been avoided.45
James told his first Parliament in 1604 that he had a divine mission
to restore peace to England. With the resumption of the continental
religious wars in 1618, James’s plea for peace could not be heard
above the noise of war. “The king would be called Rex Pacificus
to the last; his heart was not advanced to glorious achievements,”
43 [Story,] A True and Impartial History of the Most Notable Occurrences in the Kingdom
of Ireland, 100.
44 Patterson, King James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom, 29; Smuts, “The Making of Rex Pacificus,” 378; “James VI and I’s Speech of 29 March 1603,” ed. McIlwain,
271-5.
45 Beard, S.P.Q.R., 66-7; Hobbes, Leviathan, II.19 (pp. 151-2).
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wrote the third earl of Essex’s secretary and companion in the Palatine wars, Arthur Wilson. “If the king’s spirit had been raised up
to a war when the voice of God (the voice of the people) called
him to it, happily it might have hindered the great effusion of blood
among ourselves in his son’s time. But he was not the man; the work
was reserved for Gustavus [Adolphus], not Jacobus”.46 James might
have overcome some of the defects of his foreign policy of seeking peaceful relations with England’s former enemy if he had been
capable at least of projecting the image of a heroic soldier-king or
if he had shown some interest in military affairs or had made himself more available to his subjects who were always eager to see
and cheer him. Instead, he displayed only annoyance and contempt
when crowds turned out to watch him. The Scottish Court had never
developed traditions of elaborate public ceremonies involving royal
entries and progresses or other theatrical displays such as Elizabeth
had so adroitly cultivated.47 The Jacobean policy of peace was at
least partly shaped by James’s unease with being associated with
the Dutch and Bohemian revolts as well as his horror of the bloody
continental religious wars. This policy also grew out of James’s
earlier experiences in his northern kingdom with feuding aristocrats,
ungovernable Presbyterians and perpetual clan warfare. It did not do
to encourage rebels in other kingdoms when one’s own kingdoms
were so vulnerable.48
When James VI became king of England, he found that the atmosphere of the royal court and council were very different from the
rough-and-tumble politics of Scotland where ministers had insulted
him to his face. The greater wealth of the English crown, the more
elaborate court protocols and the flattery of English courtiers made
him think that he possessed more power to make policy than was actually the case. James’s foreign and military policies were frequent46 Gajda, “Debating War and Peace in Late Elizabethan England,” 52.4, 851-78; Wilson,
The Life and Reign of James, The First King of Great Britain, ii.740b-741a.
47 Smuts, Court Culture, 26-7.
48 Bevington and Holbrook, Politics of the Stuart Court Masque, 68; Scott, “England’s
Troubles, 1603-1702,” 31-2.
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ly ineffectual because of factionalism–especially that promoted by
the ascendancy of the duke of Buckingham–and prevented the king
from receiving good counsel. Able people, who could have offered
better advice, were excluded from office because Buckingham refused to listen to views that ran counter to his own opinions.49

Contemporaries and later generations of observers saw a number
of unfortunate consequences flowing from James’s policy of peace.
Sir Walter Ralegh believed that one of the basic reasons for conflict between king and Parliament was the nobility’s perception that
they had lost military power since the fifteenth century. Ralegh was
aware of the Florentine tradition and Machiavellian maxim that the
“distribution of arms” was a kind of “index to the distribution of
political capacity.”50 Matthew Wren, successively bishop of three
different sees in the time of Charles I and subsequently imprisoned
during the Interregnum, said that James feared the political power of the English peerage (as well as that of the Scottish and Irish
peerages, one might add), and tried to dilute their ranks with new
creations of non-military peers who purchased their titles. Foreign
princes sometimes requested the military services of English peers,
but James frequently denied or hindered swordsmen from seeking
opportunities for military careers abroad. The third earl of Essex
was invited by Prince Christian of Brunswick to lead a military expedition in Germany, and on another occasion the Venetian ambassador reported that Essex was willing to lead an expedition against
the Barbary pirates, but James denied the earl permission to enter
foreign service on both occasions.51 The consequence of this was,
said Bishop Wren, that when civil war broke out, his son Charles I
lacked an aristocracy with strong military traditions “able to bear the
shock and stand between him and the fury of the people.” Martial
men were also not adequately represented in the House of Lords
49 Donaldson, Scotland: James V to James VII, 213; Sharpe, Faction and Parliament,
41-2.
50 Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 356-7; Fletcher, Discourse of Government with Relation to Militias, ed. Robertson, 2-7.
51 Snow, Essex the Rebel, 83.
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during those crucial early days of the Long Parliament when the
royal prerogative and aristocratic privilege were being challenged
by the Lower House and popular demonstrations.
But the most mortal error was that [which] the king committed in wholly
disarming the nation. For fearing the martial humor of the inhabitants,
and abhorring the trouble as well as doubting the revolutions of war, he
courted the amity of all his neighbors...upon most ignominious terms;
he discountenanced all men of action; he advanced traffic [i.e., trade]
and sought to introduce plenty, that by it he might better immerse the
nation in sloth and luxury. And in this he was so unhappily fortunate that
the English gentry (anciently so renowned for valor) are enervated with
ease and debauchery, and become both the prey and scorn of the basest
of people.52

Thomas Scott taught that the nobility should display the virtue of
courage, pursue an active life, take up the sword, and avoid the corrupting influence of the pursuit of peace and profit. Scott used these
arguments to show that James I’s policy of peace could only effeminate the aristocracy.53 It was, of course, axiomatic that peace
was harmful to members of a martial culture, because if the outlet for violent passions in warfare was denied them, such persons
would pursue feuds among themselves.54 Arthur Wilson blamed the
increase in violence and popular disorder in London and the provinces during the reign of James I on the decline of opportunities for
military adventure. This he attributed to the king’s neglect of his
duties from which he was distracted by the disproportionate amount
of time he spent on hunting.
52 Wren, “Of the Origin and Progress of Revolutions in England,” i.232-4. Makower, The
English Face of Machiavelli, 243, regarded Matthew Wren, bishop of Ely as being steeped
in Machiavellian discourse. Cf. also Sidney, Discourses concerning Government, 419, and
Clark, War and Society in the Seventeenth Century, 96-7.
53 Peltonen, Classical Humanism and Republicanism in English Thought, 248.
54 Bodin, The Sixe Bookes of Commonweale, ed. MacCrae, 530.
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For the king minding his sports, many riotous demeanours crept into the
kingdom, the sunshine of peace being apt for such a production upon the
slime of late war. The sword and buckler trade being now out of date, one
corruption producing another (the City of London being always a receptacle for such, whose prodigalities and wastes made them instruments
of debaucheries), divers sects of vicious persons, going under the title
of roaring boys, bravadoes, roisterers & c., commit many insolencies:
the streets swarm night and day with bloody quarrels; private duels fomented– especially betwixt the English and the Scots; many discontents
nourished in the countries [provinces] betwixt the gentry and the commonalty about enclosures...growing in many places to petty rebellion.55

Such explicit criticisms of the Jacobean peace were, of course, written many years later, after the upheavals of the civil wars made the
censorship regulations unenforceable. However, the argument that
the failure to pursue foreign wars to provide military adventure for
over-mighty subjects when combined with court factionalism constituted a recipe for civil war that was explored even in the reign of
Elizabeth by Samuel Daniel and Shakespeare.56
Many of James’s subjects refused to accept the argument that it was
not in the best interests of the Three Kingdoms to become directly
involved in the continental religious wars. The costs of making war
had greatly increased in the reign of James I over the costs of the
Elizabethan wars,57 but critics of James’s policy of peace rejected
this argument and blamed the reluctance or inability of James I and
Charles I to go to war on court extravagance. George Wither asked
55 Wilson, The Life and Reign of James, First King of Great Britain, ii.647a. For a discussion of the Jacobean and Caroline riots in London, cf. Manning, Village Revolts, 211-19,
and Lindley, “Riot Prevention and Control in Early Stuart London,” 109-26. Brawling and
dueling by gentry and peers are discussed in Manning, Swordsmen, chs. 5-7. For James’s
obsession with hunting and his neglect of official duties, cf. Manning, Hunters and Poachers, 201-7; Sir John Harington, quoted in Park (ed.), Nugae Antiquae, i.352; and Memoirs
of Queen Elizabeth and King James, in Works of Francis Osborn, 444-5.
56 Daniel, The First Foure Bookes of the Civile Wars, in Grosart (ed.), Complete Works...
in Verse and Prose of Samuel Daniel, ii.19-26; Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part II, IV. iv; Siegel, “Shakespeare and the Neo-Chivalric Cult of Honor,” 41-2 .
57 Braddick, The Nerves of State, 28.
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Hence comes it that the rents and royalties
Of kings and princes, which did well suffice
In former times to keep in comely port
An honour’d and hospitable court,
(Yea, and an army if occasion were)
Can hardly now the charge of household bear.58

When James discovered that the English garrisons of the Dutch cautionary towns of Brill, Flushing and Bergen op Zoom had not been
paid for some considerable period of time, he accepted an offer from
the States General in 1619 to buy back the towns. The king, being
told that his treasury was empty, accepted the Dutch offer to discharge his debt to the English garrisons and to acquire the means
of paying for his forthcoming progress to Scotland.59 Swordsmen
were always ready to put the worst construction possible on James’s
motivations and actions. During the Restoration period, Algernon
Sidney insisted that James had returned the cautionary towns to the
Stadholder Maurice of Nassau so that the latter might help James
subdue his English and Scottish subjects.60
The War Party
The ‘Puritan’ or war party at the court of James I continued to favor
assisting Protestant allies abroad. Its adherents were not only dismayed by James’s peace treaty with Spain, but also spoke out against
the Dutch government’s negotiations leading up to the Twelve Years
Truce (1609-21). It was reported to John Chamberlain that “the men
of war oppose mightily against it.” After having fought in the Dutch
struggle for independence for a couple of generations and lost many
of their comrades, British swordsmen believed that they had a voice
in this matter as well. For his part, James “rejoiceth not a little” at
the cessation of hostilities, the same correspondent reported.61
58 Wither, Britain’s Remembrancer, 365.
59 Howell, Epistolae Ho-Elianae, i.29-31.
60 Sidney, Court Maxims, 162-3.
61 S. Adams, “Foreign Policy and the Parliaments of 1621 and 1624,” 93-4.
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There was little the English government could do to assist the king
and queen of Bohemia when Imperialist forces expelled them from
their kingdom in 1620, although individual swordsmen such as Sir
Andrew Gray and William Craven, later Lord Craven, volunteered
their services and raised troops. What energized the ‘Puritan’ party
was the news, early in 1620, that Ambrose Spinola, marquis of Balbases, was making preparations to lead the Spanish Army of Flanders in an invasion of the Rhenish Palatinate to join up with Imperialist forces and so deprive his son-in-law and daughter, Frederick
and Elizabeth of Bohemia, of their remaining possessions within the
Empire and to make war against the Protestant Union. The invasion
of the Palatinate began in May 1620. The ‘Puritan’ or war party
which advocated intervention consisted of a coalition of swordsmen, parliamentary leaders and ecclesiastics. Those at court included Philip Herbert, third earl of Pembroke, George Abbot, archbishop
of Canterbury, and James Hay, first Viscount Doncaster and later
first earl of Carlisle, who had just returned from the continent with
the news of Spinola’s invasion plans in early 1620.62 The senior advocate of intervention in the Palatinate among the swordsmen was
Henry Wriothesley, third earl of Southampton. The Palatine ambassador had proposed that Southampton should command a military
expedition to the Palatinate, but the earl was personally unacceptable
to James. He was linked to the cult of the second earl of Essex, had
more enemies at court than friends and was thought to be more than
half a republican. In 1619, when the office of lord admiral became
vacant, Southampton was regarded as a leading contender because
he was the only high-ranking peer who had actually commanded
at sea, but he was passed over and the office went to Buckingham.
Southampton was also closely associated with Sir Edwin Sandys,
the parliamentary leader who was thought to share Southampton’s
radical views.63
62 S. Adams, “Foreign Policy and the Parliaments of 1621 and 1624,” 141-3; Snow, Essex
the Rebel, 93-4.
63 Wilson, The Life and Reign of James, ii.736b; Rowse, Shakespeare’s Southampton,
264-7.
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Following the prorogation of Parliament in June 1621, Southampton
was accused of disloyalty to the king and confined to the house of
John Williams, dean of Westminster (who was shortly to become
lord keeper). Sandys, Henry de Vere, eighteenth earl of Oxford, and
John Selden were also confined. Southampton was released through
the intercession of Williams, Buckingham and Lancelot Andrewes,
bishop of Winchester. His main offence appears to have been a sympathy for the queen of Bohemia and her children which James regarded as excessive. Because Southampton, the third earl of Essex
and other swordsmen were suspect in the king’s eyes, Archbishop
Abbot proved to be the more effective proponent for armed intervention in the Palatinate. Abbot told James that he could not neglect
such a holy cause, and he received royal permission to collect a voluntary contribution from the clergy and to solicit contributions from
the people to help with the costs of a military expedition.64

In order to intervene in the Palatinate, it would be necessary to have
the cooperation and logistical support of the Dutch who controlled
the Rhine and Maas estuaries. Eventually, it would be necessary to
borrow veteran troops from the States’ Army and replace them with
fresh recruits from the British Isles, because there was no standing
army in England; James had allowed the English forces in Ireland
to wither away to barely 1,000 soldiers, and it would not do to strip
Ireland of the remaining English forces. The Dutch could do little to
help until the expiration of the Treaty of Antwerp ended the Twelve
Years Truce in 1621. Because James had allowed the arms industry
and the military administration built up under Elizabeth to atrophy,
his government was prepared to do little in 1620. The Council of
War, for example, did not have its first meeting until the spring of
1624. The military expeditions which were finally sent to the Palatinate, together with the other military and naval expeditions of
the 1620s, would make it quite clear that the early-Stuart monarchs
were neither motivated nor competent to undertake the planning and
conduct of war–even when they enjoyed the support of their sub64 Wilson, The Life and Reign of James, 274-5; Snow, Essex the Rebel, 93-4.
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jects in doing so. In the long run, only Parliament would possess the
resolve and financial means to make war, but although Parliament
mounted a very successful war effort in the 1640s, it had refused to
accept the financial responsibility for paying for a war to which they
had only given lip-service in the 1620s.65
As the government of James I inadvertently descended into war in
the 1620s, it was hampered not only by a lack of administrative
institutions for prosecuting war, but also by a paucity of military
and naval commanders with recent experience. The Council of War,
when it finally got around to meeting in 1624, was composed exclusively of aging veterans of the Elizabethan wars, Sir Edward Conway, Arthur, first Lord Chichester, Sir Horace Vere, Oliver St John,
first Lord Grandison, George, Lord Carew and Sir John Ogle. They
were hand-picked by Buckingham who stayed in touch with men of
military experience. They were all anti-Spanish, and inevitably their
frame of reference was the deeds which they had performed in those
wars. This promoted a nostalgia for the glories of the Elizabethan
wars which tended to exaggerate the contributions of the late queen
and to promote a less than favorable comparison with the lack of
military exploits on the part of James I and Charles I.66
This harking back to the glorious days of Queen Elizabeth was a
theme which swordsmen and poets were not slow in taking up. Fulke Greville’s Life of Sidney, although not published until 1628– long
after his death–was not a mere life of Sidney, but a panegyric which
was meant to praise Sir Philip Sidney’s martial image and his ethical approach to politics. By implication, Greville condemned James
I’s policy of peace and his failure to go to the aid of endangered
Protestant princes and communities. Sir Walter Ralegh, also an admirer of Sidney, called him “the Scipio, Cicero and Petrarch of our
65 Breslow, A Mirror of England, 35-6; Adams, “Foreign Policy and the Parliaments of
1621 and 1624;” Fissel (ed.), War and Government in Britain, 6-7; Stewart, The English
Ordnance Office, 143-6; Wheeler, The Making of a Grear Power, v-vi, 15; The military
and naval expeditions of the 1620’s are discussed in Manning, Apprenticeship in Arms,
ch.8.
66 Smuts, Court Culture and the Origins of a Royalist Tradition, 22-3; Cogswell, Blessed
Revolution, 97; Lockyer, Buckingham, 85.
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time.” Michael Drayton, who fondly remembered English chivalry
in the age of Sidney and the second earl of Essex, realized that no
court patronage was to be had for idolizing Sidney; so he decided
instead to write the Battaile of Agincourt to exemplify the martial
values of an earlier age. Drayton later praised the belated conversion
of Prince Charles and Buckingham to an anti-Spanish policy. This
probably helped to procure official permission to publish the Battaile of Agincourt, but it brought little else in the way of patronage
from Buckingham. Drayton’s disappointment led him to believe
that he lived in an “evil time,” and that only poetry could preserve
the older tradition of English honor.67
James I was angered by the joint Spanish-Imperialist invasion of the
Palatinate, and he felt that he had been deceived in this matter by
the Spanish ambassador, the Count Gondomar, with whom he had
earlier collaborated to preserve peace. James gave permission for an
expedition of 2,200 men led by Sir Horace Vere, the commander of
the English forces in the States’ Army, including two companies of
250 men each raised and led by the earls of Oxford and Essex, to
proceed to the Palatinate in 1620, but he refused to be drawn personally into the Palatine intervention. Arthur Wilson, who accompanied
Essex to the Palatinate, wrote of James: “yet would not his spirit set
on work to preserve his children’s patrimony– so odious was the
name of war to him!” Most of the members of the two companies
raised by Oxford and Essex consisted of gentlemen volunteers “who
went to make themselves capable of better employment–the English for many years having been truants in that art.” Subsequently,
the two companies raised by Oxford and Essex were expanded into
regiments, but the intervention failed, and the English garrison defending the Palatine capital Heidelberg was massacred.68 Instead of
supporting intervention in the Palatinate, James continued to seek
67 Worden, The Sound of Virtue, 13-14; McCrea, “Whose Life Is It Anyway?”, 304-7; McCoy, “Old English Honour in an Evil Time,” 146-52.
68 Cogswell, Blessed Revolution, 20; Wilson, Life and Reign of James, First King of Great
Britain, ii.722a-724a; Brennan Pursell, “War or Peace? Jacobean Politics and the Parliament of 1621,” 149-85.
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a diplomatic solution by pursuing negotiations to arrange a marriage between Charles and the Spanish Infanta. The Spanish were
delighted to string James along in these negotiations without ever
intending to agree to a marriage alliance while the joint SpanishImperialist forces mopped up in the Palatinate. James gave much
away by cutting off the supply of volunteers to the Elector Palatine,
while allowing the Spanish to raise two regiments for the Spanish
Army of Flanders led by Edward, Lord Vaux and Archibald, earl of
Argyll.69
The Chivalric Revival and Martial Culture
Following the Anglo-Spanish Peace Treaty of 1604, James I’s appeasement of Spain continued to dismay the swordsmen. There was
a revival of chivalric culture at the court of Henry, prince of Wales
that protested James I’s policy of peace as well as the corruption and
debauchery that were thought to pervade the latter’s court. This new
chivalric culture was characterized by a martial ethos, which harked
back to the circle of Sir Philip Sidney and the followers of Robert,
second earl of Essex and which promoted a continuation of the war
at sea, an expansion of empire in the New World and English participation in a Protestant league directed against the Hapsburg threat
in Germany and the Low Countries. Evidence that this aristocratic
bellicosity enjoyed popular support can be found on the Jacobean
stage.70 Because of his precocious martial inclinations, the court of
Henry Frederick, prince of Wales, became a focal point for the surviving adherents of the Elizabethan war party, which included many
veterans of the wars in Ireland, the Netherlands and France. They
believed that England must not only remain committed to the cause
of Pan-European Protestantism, but should also exercise leadership
and seize the initiative. The young Prince Henry held a reversionary
interest and willingly played the role of Protestant knight-errant and
69 Cogswell, Blessed Revolution, 20, 274-5; Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, sub
Archibald Campbell, 7th earl of Argyll, Edward, 4th Lord Vaux et Thomas, 2nd Lord Vaux.
70 Marshall, “That’s the Misery of Peace,” 2-3; Gajda, The Earl of Essex and Late Elizabethan Political Culture, 67, 105.
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filled the void created by his father’s pacifism. Henry studied to cultivate a martial image, and was seen to devote himself to horsemanship, archery, the manual of arms of the pike, and other aspects of
the exercise of arms. Although not old enough to joust, he delighted
in royal tournaments by running at the ring. In 1610, when he was
sixteen, Henry fought a contest on foot across a barricade with six
others in the Royal Banqueting Hall. Continuing disappointment in
the king made Henry, who was viewed as an embodiment of chivalric virtues and a prince dedicated to the Protestant cause abroad, a
popular figure who promised to grow into a soldier-king. The portraits painted of him, especially the one by Marcus Gheeraerts, were
meant to depict this martial image. Moreover, while his zeal gave
comfort to those advocating a continuing engagement in Europe’s
religious wars, his soundness in religion reassured the clergy.71
Prince Henry’s two great heroes were Henry IV of France and Maurice of Nassau because they were soldier-princes who led their men
into battle. Henry was instrumental in securing knighthoods of the
Garter for both his heroes, and their portraits were prominently displayed in the prince’s gallery at St James’s Palace. Henry was too
young to travel to the Netherlands to participate in Maurice’s school
of war, but he had the next best thing. A Dutch captain, Abraham
van Nyevelt, came to England in 1611 to instruct Prince Henry in
fortifications, encampments, tactics and other aspects of modern
warfare and military engineering. In effect, Prince Henry and his
tutors, who also included Samuel Daniel and James Cleland, tried to
replicate in miniature something like Maurice’s school of war.72 Sir
Charles Cornwallis records how Henry tried to set a good example
71 Strong, Henry, Prince of Wales, 66-7, 72; Catriona Murray, “The Pacific King and the
Militant Prince? Representation and Collaboration in the Letters Patent of James I, Creating his Son, Henry, Prince of Wales,” 1-16; Young, Tudor and Jacobean Tournaments, 3840; Wilson, Life and Reign of James, First King of Great Britain, ii.684b-685a; Collinson,
The Birthpangs of Protestant England, 130-1; Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, 244-55;
McCullough, Sermons at Court, 193; “A Discourse of the Most Illustrious Prince Henry,
Prince of Wales,” ed. Sir Walter Scott, ii.217-18; Williamson, The Myth of the Conqueror,
9; Wells, “Manhood and Chivalrie,” 395; Price, Praelium & Premium, 4-5, 8.
72 For a discussion of the practice of English and Scots gentlemen volunteers going to the
court and camp of Maurice of Nassau to serve an apprenticeship in arms, see Manning,
“Prince Maurice’s School of War,” 1-19.
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for the members of his court who were tutored alongside him, including the third earl of Essex and James, second Lord Harington
of Exton, by making good use of his time studying and preparing
for civil as well as military offices by reading history, mathematics
and cosmography. “His other exercises were dancing, leaping, and
learning to swim; and some times walking fast and far to accustom
and enable him to make a long march when time should require
it.” Henry took a particular interest in the navy in order to prepare
himself for a “naval war with Spain, whensoever that king should
give a cause of public hostility.” Prince Henry had even worked out
a naval strategy whereby part of the fleet would be sent to blockade
Spain when hostilities resumed and the remainder dispatched to the
West Indies.73
Sir Robert Dallington, who was later to become associated with the
household of Prince Henry, was already a spokesman for the swordsmen when his View of Fraunce was composed in about 1598. Henry
had become acquainted with Dallington’s writings before Dallington became a gentleman of the Privy Chamber to Henry. Dallington
served as one of the links between Sir Philip Sidney and the court
of Henry and brought to the prince’s household the kind of Lipsian
active engagement in politics, which had characterized the circles
of Sidney and the second earl of Essex.74 Dallington also wrote a
volume of aphorisms dedicated to Prince Henry and intended for
his scrutiny. They contained a goodly dose of Tacitism, and the very
first aphorism states that war is more devastating for those countries
which have enjoyed long periods of peace and a soft life. Elsewhere
Dallington states:
73 Strong, Henry, Prince of Wales, 68, 72-3; Snow, Essex the Rebel, 34-5; Cornwallis, A
Discourse of... Henry, late Prince of Wales, iv.333-40.
74 Justus Lipsius (1547-1606) was a Flemish humanist scholar who published a critical
Latin edition of the works of Tacitus, and was a proponent of Neo-Stoicism which provided a more ethical approach to the issues of politics and war than had Machiavelli and
which philosophy was more acceptable to both Catholics and Protestants. Lipsius advocated an engagement with political issues, a dedication to duty, and an acceptance of war
as part of the human condition and God’s plan. During the time that Lipsius resided in the
Dutch Republic, his writings helped to make service as a professional soldier in standing
armies more respectable. (Useful discussions of Lipsian Neo-Stoicism are found in Oestreich, Neostoicism and the Early Modern State, trans. McLintock; and McCrea, Constant
Minds.)
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It is a manly virtue in a prince... to prepare for war when he propounds
for peace; and not to stay his provisions for the one though he be treating
upon conditions for the other. Because otherwise he seems to beg or buy
his peace and gets it not but at a higher rate. Wherefore peace is never to
be treated with our armor off or sword sheathed, nor to be concluded but
under a buckler and upon sure terms.75

A similar message was contained in a hortatory poem in the Senecan style of verse by William Alexander, earl of Stirling, reminding
Prince Henry and others that a king who does not prepare for war in
time of peace and who does not go to war from time to time will be
brought into contempt.76 Another writer who urged Prince Henry to
take up the sword to defend the cause of Protestantism against the
pope, was Philippe Duplessis de Mornay, who had been a friend of
Sidney. Samson Lennard, the translator of Mornay’s The Mysterie of
Iniquitie and Sidney’s companion-in-arms at the Battle of Zutphen,
said that although the book was formally dedicated to King James,
Mornay had also directed a message to Prince Henry: the king’s
“pen hath made way for your sword, and his peace, if God give him
long life, may further your wars.”77
The swordsmen who gathered around the court of Henry, prince of
Wales and who looked to him to become the kind of soldier-king
James I never was, had learned well the Tacitean lesson that long
periods of peace at home promoted vice, luxury, corruption and effeminacy and a loss of all the ancient Roman virtues. This naturally
promoted a contempt for James I’s efforts to promote peace. It also
led to a distrust of courtier culture which was exacerbated by the
tendency to put a Tacitean construction upon Prince Henry’s death
from typhoid fever in 1612 by relating that tragedy to Tacitus’s account of the poisoning of Germanicus, the martial nephew and heir
of the Emperor Tiberius.78
75 Dallington, The View of Fraunce, sig. L2; Dallington, Aphorismes Civill and Militarie,
sig. A4, pp. 1, 259.
76 “A Paraenesis to Prince Henry,” ed. Kastner and Charlton, i.402.
77 Mornay, The Mysterie of Iniquitie, transl. Lennard, dedication.
78 Smuts, “Court-Centred Politics and the Use of Roman Historians,” 36-7; Smuts, Court
Culture and the Origins of a Royalist Tradition, 26.
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The Parliament of 1621 was summoned by James I because his foreign policy of peace with Spain had collapsed after Philip III’s forces
had invaded the Palatinate in September 1620. Although James had
previously considered foreign policy part of the royal prerogative
and none of Parliament’s business, he now gave Parliament leave
to discuss a policy with regard to the Palatinate.79 The course of
the debates indicated that the question was not whether to become
involved in the Thirty Years War in Germany, but rather how and
to what extent. At the same time, James continued to pursue a personal policy of peace with the Spanish by resuming negotiations for
a marriage treaty. Thus, his own personal foreign policy was at odds
with the one being formulated by Parliament and was carried out
by his own personal representatives since the members of the Privy
Council refused to cooperate. This did not escape the attention of
the martialists, and in 1624 an anonymous pamphlet entitled Robert,
Earl of Essex’s Ghost was published criticizing James’s continuing
pursuit of peace and a Spanish match. It attacked the government’s
plea that James’s revenues were inadequate for war and said that
James should use some of the royal plate and jewels from the Tower
of London to pay for the expenses of war. It further asserted that
the king’s subjects would be willing to pay for a more bellicose foreign and military policy if the king consulted with Parliament about
the implementation of such a policy.80 William Crosse, fellow of St
Mary’s Hall, Oxford, who had been chaplain to Sir John Ogle’s Regiment in the Dutch army and would later accompany the expeditions
to Cadiz and the Isle of Rhé, wrote a long epic poem intended to
help rally support for intervention in the Palatinate. Crosse reflected a body of opinion which had regarded the Anglo-Spanish Peace
Treaty of 1604 and the Hispano-Dutch Truce of 1609 as “milk-sop
treaties,” which had interrupted “our raging arms.” Crosse went on
79 James had previously sought to ban the publication of news about foreign affairs, which
he believed in no way concerned his subjects. These news stories about foreign events
were purveyed in early newspapers called “corantos” (Randall, Credibility in Elizabethan
and Early Stuart Military News, 66, 88).
80 Adams, “Foreign Policy and the Parliaments of 1621 and 1624,” 139, 141; anon., Robert, Earl of Essex’s Ghost, v.240.
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to praise Sir Edward Cecil, Sir Edward Conway and Sir John Burgh
as valiant soldiers. The Veres, the earl of Oxford, Sir Francis and Sir
Horace Vere, he called the “three thunderbolts of war.” What Crosse
looked forward to was a crusade to be joined in by the English, the
Dutch and the French to stop the growth of Spanish and Imperialist
power throughout the world.81
After the death of Henry, prince of Wales, martialists urged Prince
Charles, with the usual Tacitean arguments, to project a martial image. Charles at first appeared to follow his deceased brother’s example and to perfect his military and equestrian skills and to participate
in jousting tournaments in the Tiltyard at Westminster; he even read
Sidney and the heroic poems of Torquato Tasso which depicted the
recovery of Jerusalem. However, the attempt to depict Charles’s
pursuit of the Spanish Infanta as a chivalric adventure convinced
very few people, and his subsequent marriage to a French Catholic princess, his continuing dependence upon Buckingham and their
mismanagement of the military and naval expeditions of the mid1620s destroyed whatever image of a Protestant soldier-prince he
ever possessed.82
Following Buckingham’s assassination in 1628, Charles I lost heart
and withdrew from an ineffectual and underfinanced policy of Protestant bellicosity into neutralism. Most European monarchies and
republics were creating the administrative apparatus of the modern
state by waging war and developing new sources of revenue at the
same time. But Charles I attempted to reform his government and
enhance his revenues when there was no military emergency to justify asking Parliament for subsidies or reviving old feudal exactions.
This simply was not persuasive. Charles refused to be drawn into
any more military adventures in mainland Europe because he had
come to fear his domestic enemies more than those abroad.83 The
81 Cross[e], Belgiae’s Troubles and Triumphs, sig. A2, pp. 2-4.
82 Markham, Five Decades of Epistles of Warre, sig.A3v; Hunt, “Civic Chivalry and the
English Civil War,” 229-20.
83 Scott, England’s Troubles, 114.
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period of peace which characterized Charles I’s reign between 1628
and 1638 made courtiers think that the mainland European wars had
nothing to do with them, while swordsmen readily found employment in other European armies. When news arrived that Gustavus
Adolphus had been mortally wounded leading his soldiers at the Battle of Lützen in 1632, Thomas Carew wrote the poem “In Answer of
an Elegiacall Letter upon the death of the King of Sweden.”
But there are subjects proper to our clime.
Tourneys, masques, theatres, better become
Our halcyon days; what though the German drum
Bellow for freedom and revenge, the noise
Concerns not us, nor should divert our joys;
Nor ought the thunder of carbines
Drown the sweet air of our violins. ...84

The appearance of domestic peace in Caroline England between
1628 and 1638 was deceptive. The so-called Caroline peace was
a myth. Edward Hyde, earl of Clarendon’s perception was that it
was based upon a royal injunction not to discuss political problems.
Charles’s subjects were commanded to be silent in the pulpit, the
press and in Parliament. Parliament was dissolved “and all men
were inhibited upon the penalty of censure so much as to speak of
a Parliament.” Even though many of the swordsmen were away
fighting in the continental wars, interpersonal violence involving
courtiers and gentry persisted as French fashions in duelling spread
and often involved multiple combats. As Caroline Hibbard points
out in her study of the court of Charles I, the king and many members of the court viewed politics in terms of personal honor, and this
mentality contained a potential for greater violence. Professor Hibbard also argues that the degree of factionalism at court–especially
during the ascendancy of the royal favorite Buckingham– has been
underestimated. Moreover, by his marriage to Henrietta Maria, who
personally disliked Cardinal Richelieu and had close ties to dissident
French nobles, together with the English intervention in the internal
affairs of France by going to the aid of the Huguenots at the siege of
84 Dunlap (ed.), Poems of Thomas Carew, 77.
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La Rochelle, Charles set a very bad example–something concerning
which Elizabeth and James I would have been more circumspect.85
The concept of perpetual peace and the idleness it would bring may
have been the one thing that struck terror in the hearts of swordsmen.
The possibility that this concept might become a reality during the
reigns of James VI and I and Charles I also contributed to a growing
aristocratic unease with their monarchs who ignored the plight of
Protestant communities abroad which were fighting a losing battle
with the Hapsburgs. The failure to project the image of soldier-kings
must be considered a weakness of the early-Stuart monarchs. This
need to maintain a martial image was not only a legacy of the Middle Ages; it was also a practice urged by modern political theorists,
military writers and many divines. It was still widely accepted that
the cultivation of martial virtues promoted wisdom and justice as
well, and these values were reinforced by the spreading influence
of Tacitism. The belief that the failure to exercise arms and cultivate military prowess led to moral degeneracy was widely accepted
among the aristocracy, and the movement to establish provincial
artillery companies on the model of the Honourable Artillery Company of London provides evidence that these beliefs were trickling
down to the urban elites.86
Clearly, the values of the military aristocrats of England, which by
1625 included more than half the peerage (as well as more than half
the peerages of Scotland and Ireland),87 were diverging from those
of the Stuart Court. In their view, the failure to go to the aid of the
Palatines brought dishonor upon the Stuart dynasty, and the reluctance to sustain alliances with Protestant princes and powers caused
dismay. Despite continuing goodwill towards their monarchs, many
people of the British Isles viewed foreign princes such as Maurice
of Nassau and Gustavus Adolphus as their heroes.
85 Manning, Swordsmen, chs. 5, 6 and 7; Hibbard, “Theatre of Dynasty,” 162, 168.
86 Manning, Apprenticeship in Arms, 130-1, 143-50.
87 Manning, Swordsmen, p.18, Table 1.1.
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It would be interesting to speculate whether the political history of
the 1630s and 1640s might not have been different had not so many
martial men from the British Isles found employment and outlets for
their assertiveness in the continental religious wars. As it was, many
aristocrats were already perceiving that the value placed upon their
valor had diminished, and the failure of the early-Stuart monarchs
to provide military employment in their own service caused those
aristocrats to reflect upon the extent to which their power had diminished in the previous century and a quarter. This might well have
undermined their feelings of loyalty to Charles I.
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